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This paper examines the impact of prior crash risk on insider trading behaviour using a 
sample of Chinese A-share firms for the 2010-2015 period. Prior crash risk is publicly available 
information yet represents a source of informational advantage for insiders due to their unique 
capacity to assess its impact on stock price. Consistent with this assertion, we find a positive 
correlation between prior crash risk and insider sales value scaled by firm value. This result is 
robust to market sentiment and contrarian strategy. The result still holds after accounting for 
possible endogeneity issues using a two-stage least squares estimation. Additionally, we find the 
relationship is attenuated in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), where corporate governance affects 
insider motivation and creates administrative restrictions. Our study contributes to the growing 
literature on crash risk consequences by examining its association with insider trading behaviour. 
Our results are economically meaningful and feature important implications for investors, boards 
of directors, and policymakers.  
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It is commonly accepted that insiders within a firm know more than outsiders. The 
opportunity for insiders to abuse this information advantage presents itself through insider 
trading, where insiders can buy (sell) under- (over-) valued shares based on information about 
impending firm-specific news. The Enron scandal represents one of the most well-known 
examples of willful corporate abuse. Executives used off-balance Special Purpose Vehicles to 
hide assets that were losing money. Meanwhile they informed the investing public that stock 
prices would continue to rise while secretly unloading their own shares. Between August 2000 
and August 2001, share prices had fallen from $90 to $42 as analysts began to question whether 
Enron stock was overvalued. By December 2001, share prices plummeted to less than $1 and 
shareholders filed a $40 billion lawsuit. Twenty-one people were found guilty and convicted for 
a number of crimes including bank fraud, securities fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy, and insider 
trading. Executives at Enron enjoyed windfall gains of nearly $900 million through illegal 
insider trading. The Enron case remains one of the most significant examples highlighting the 
extent and impact of stock price crash – $74 billion of shareholder value evaporated, 4500 
employees lost their jobs and life savings, and social trust in capital markets was shattered. This 
event triggered the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which requires top managers to certify 
financial statement accuracy and increases the severity of penalties for fraudulent activity, with 
the aim of decreasing information asymmetry between insiders and external investors. Other 
well-known companies like Nortel and Zynga suffered similar stock price crashes that heavily 
influenced insider trading behaviour. 
Numerous studies demonstrate a significant and positive link between crash risk and 
information asymmetry, and the resulting impact that this asymmetry has on firms and the 
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market as a whole (eg. Hutton, Marcus, & Tehranian, 2009; Kim, Li, & Zhang, 2011a). The 
majority of the research on crash risk focuses on its determinants such as religion (Callen & 
Fang, 2015), social trust (Li, Wang, & Wang, 2017), and equity incentives (Kim et al., 2011a). 
My study focuses on the effect of crash risk on insider trading behaviour. Insider trading plays an 
important role in the financial market, though its ethical aspects are a grey area for many 
investors. Prior studies have examined insider trading through the lens of legitimacy, information 
efficiency, and ethics, and offer compelling arguments for and against unregulated insider 
trading (see Meulbroek, 1992; McGee, 2008). The term “insider trading” is subject to many 
definitions and connotations, and encompasses both legal and illegal activity. Legal insider 
trading occurs every day when corporate insiders – officers, directors, or employees – buy or sell 
stock in their own companies within the confines of company policy and government regulations 
(Newkirk & Robertson, 1998). Transactions are illegal when based on non-public and material 
information. Information is considered public if it is available to analysts following a firm. 
Information is considered material if it can impact share price. China defines material 
information in Article 75 of the Securities of the People’s Republic of China as “information that 
concerns the business or finance of a company or may have a major effect on the market price of 
the securities” (Securities Law, 2018). In contrast to the United States, the news regarding 
insider trading in China is scarce, despite its purported rampancy (Cheng, 2008). Due to the 
nature of China’s legal environment and the relative inefficiency of the Chinese Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), insiders are rarely prosecuted without significant political 
backing. Only recently has China embarked on an anti-corruption campaign targeting its 
financial sector with its high-profile arrest of Xu Xiang in January 2017, later convicted of 
insider trading and sentenced to 5 years in prison and fined 11 billion yuan (US $1.6 billion). 
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My study focuses on how prior crash risk – a publicly available source of information - 
affects insider trading behaviour. Despite being publicly available, prior crash risk may not be 
adequately captured in share price due to its abstract nature. Therefore, it presents a source of 
potential information advantage for insiders who are better able to assess their firm’s intrinsic 
value. Due to the cost of collecting information, the public will often have less access to 
information, and their information will be less accurate and timely. Inversely, insiders possess a 
greater access to information owing to their proximity to business decisions. This access may 
come from a variety of sources such as knowledge of an impending IPO, company leverage, or 
earnings. I follow Jin and Myer’s (2006) bad news hoarding theory of crash risk, which states 
that managers will hold on to bad news in order to receive private benefits up until the point 
where the costs of withholding the bad news are greater than the benefits they enjoy. At this 
point, they release the bad news all at once and the accumulated impact causes stock price to 
crash. In opaque environments, the bad news is easier for managers to hide, which increases the 
firm’s crash risk. Meanwhile, firm crash risk also affects how an insider will trade their own 
shares, opting to potentially buy (sell) shares when firm crash risk is low (high). Owing to the 
transparent nature of these relationships, insiders must consider the legal and corporate responses 
to their trading behaviour. Prior research has shown that insiders avoid ex ante transactions due 
to the increased regulatory scrutiny and legal sanctions associated with such transactions (Noe, 
1999; Huddart, Ke, & Shi, 2007; Kallunki, Nilsson, & Hellström, 2009). Insiders weigh the 
perceived financial benefits of a transaction against the potential costs of enforcement and 
litigation.  
Although empirical literature has argued for the firm-specific benefits of insider trading, 
regulators often blame insider trading for inducing excessive managerial risk taking. Excessive 
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risk taking behaviour does not necessarily create crash risk, as undesired high levels of 
managerial risk-taking can be managed by rational investors and the board of directors (Kim et 
al., 2011a). However, when managers withhold information, uninformed investors and boards 
are not able to take timely corrective action or adjust price levels until a crash occurs. Managers 
are incentivized to withhold information as this creates scenarios where they can benefit from an 
information advantage. Since information asymmetry contributes to crash risk, an information-
motivated insider transaction will negatively impact a firm and its investors. 
The relevant literature, with the exception of Jin and Myers (2006), uses U.S. data. I use 
instead a database on the emerging Chinese A-share market to examine several hypotheses. A 
detailed study using the Chinese stock market will allow me to shed light on insider behaviour in 
an emerging market and the findings could be useful to investors and regulators in China and 
other emerging markets in terms of understanding how prior crash risk relates to insider decision 
making. China’s securities market presents a unique landscape for the study of crash risk and 
insider trading. First, unlike in the U.S., Chinese stock exchanges use price-limit rules that help 
to reduce crash risk. The 10% limit on daily price fluctuations serves as a market stabilization 
tool and reduces large price movements. The empirical and theoretical evidence regarding the 
efficacy of price-limit rules is controversial, though Deb, Kalev, and Marisetty (2010) explain 
that daily price-limit rules increase monitoring efficiency in environments prone to price 
manipulations. Second, insider trading in China’s A-share market is a relatively new 
phenomenon – prior to market reform in 2007, insiders were not allowed to trade their shares. 
Third, stock trading in China is primarily composed of retail investors, who account for over 
80% of total trading volume (CSRC, 2017). Recent New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) data 
reveals that retail investors represent less than 2% of NYSE trading volume and that the 
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remainder is composed of institutional investors (Evans, 2006). Institutional investors are 
significantly better at acquiring firm-specific information which serves to reduce insider 
information advantage. Fourth, corporate governance in Chinese firms differ greatly from their 
U.S. counterparts. Ownership in China is highly concentrated into single families or the 
government, while U.S. firm ownership is much more dispersed. While state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac exist in the U.S., they are rather unique compared to 
the abundance of SOEs in China. SOEs differ from traditional public companies as the 
government appoints managers and profit is often not the primary objective. Finally, the 
regulatory and legal environment in China is immature in comparison to the United States. 
Systems designed to monitor insider trading are ineffective as financial reports lack both 
transparency and timeliness. Similarly, enforcements against insider trading are subject to 
politics rather than law. In the U.S., victims of illegal insider trading may pursue civil action in 
addition to a federal investigation. In China, there is no legal recourse for victims and courts 
rarely convict insider trading. 
For my empirical analysis, following Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) and Xu, Jiang, Chan, 
and Yi (2013), I use the negative coefficient of skewness (NCSKEW), down-to-up volatility 
(DUVOL), and daily returns severely below the mean (COUNT) to measure crash risk. For my 
insider trading variables, I modify Huddart and Ke’s (2007) measures to construct an individual 
insider sales measure scaled by firm size (SALES VP) and aggregate measures based on firm-
year and firm-half-year. Using a sample of 4134 individual insider transactions, my findings 
suggest that insiders in China use publicly available crash risk information to make more 
informed trading decisions than external investors. Ifind that a firm’s increase in prior crash risk 
leads to an increase in insider sales value and this positive relation is attenuated in SOEs. In 
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contrast, I find little evidence that prior crash risk affects aggregate firm insider trading. My 
results are robust to alternative variable measures and different regression model specifications. 
My paper offers several contributions to the literature. First, I examine the impact of 
crash risk on insider transaction value. Prior research has examined crash risk as a dependent 
variable, but its use as an explanatory variable allows me to draw conclusions about its relative 
value in explaining insider decisions compared to other variables commonly used in the 
literature. Understanding how an insider reacts to crash risk is crucial for firms seeking to 
mitigate future crash risk and protect shareholder value. Xing, Zhang, and Zhao (2010) and Yan 
(2011) both suggest that extreme distributions of stock returns have a major effect on investor 
welfare. Therefore, my study is valuable in understanding the role that insider trading plays in 
influencing both corporate behaviour and investor welfare. Second, most studies focus on 
developed markets, especially the U.S., and provide limited insight into developing markets with 
different legal and corporate environments. My study complements previous studies by 
observing an emerging market. Third, I examine how corporate governance in a developing 
market affects trading decisions. Specifically, I study how ultimate shareholder status in a firm 
affects the crash risk – insider trading relationship. A greater understanding of the effects of 
corporate governance helps promote efforts in the development of more stringent control 
measures for managing undesirable insider behaviour.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 conducts a review of the 
related literature. Section 3 explores my hypothesis development. Section 4 describes the data 
and the measurement of key variables. Section 5 contains my empirical analysis and section 6 
contains my conclusion and limitations. 
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2. Literature Review  
2.1 Crash Risk  
Crash risk is the probability of a firm-specific crash, conceptually understood as extreme 
negative values in the distribution of returns after controlling for co-movement factors (Kim, Li, 
& Zhang, 2011b; Kim et al., 2011a). Jin and Myers (2006) provide the theoretical framework for 
the bad news hoarding theory of crash risk, arguing that information asymmetries between 
managers and shareholders contribute to crash risk. The theory suggests that managers hoard bad 
news in order to extract benefits from the firm, such as continued employment, excess perks (Xu, 
Li, Yuan, & Chan, 2014), equity incentives (Kim et al., 2011b), and reputation (Ball, Jayaraman, 
& Shivakumar, 2009). Managers bear a cost for withholding bad news by making up the 
difference between the firm’s actual performance and investors’ estimate of that performance; 
this cost is lower in opaque information environments and correspondingly, managers are able to 
withhold relatively more bad news. When this cost reaches a certain threshold, managers choose 
to release the accumulated bad news, resulting in a stock price crash – a large negative outlier in 
the distribution of returns. Consistent with the bad news theory, a survey by Graham, Harvey, 
and Rajgopal (2005) finds that managers possessing bad news tend to delay disclosure more than 
those with good news. Kothari, Li, and Short (2009), in their study on dividend changes and 
earnings forecasts, provide similar evidence demonstrating that managers delay the release of 
bad news to investors. Hutton et al. (2009) and Kim et al. (2011a) quantitatively support the bad 
news hoarding theory by providing evidence of a significant, positive relationship between crash 
risk and extreme information asymmetry.  
The current crash risk landscape is heavily focused on the determinants of firm-specific 
crash risk, but there is a paucity of research on the consequences of crash risk. This is rather 
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surprising given how crucial it is to understand how firms and regulators respond in order to 
mitigate future crash risk and protect shareholder value. To the best of my knowledge, only two 
papers examine how firm-specific crash risk affects firm operations. An, Li, and Yu (2015) 
examine how crash risk affects speed of leverage adjustment and how this effect is moderated by 
the information environment. Using data from 41 countries from 1989 to 2013, they show that 
firms with a higher crash risk more slowly adjust their financial leverages towards targets. They 
also show that the negative relationship between crash risk and speed of leverage adjustment is 
less pronounced for firms in countries with more transparent financial reporting environments. 
Hackenbrack, Jenkins, and Pevzner (2014) demonstrate a 2% increase in clients’ audit fees ahead 
of a price crash occurrence. They employ crash risk as a proxy for auditors’ perception of 
idiosyncratic risk and their findings suggest that this is a significant driver in audit fee increases.  
2.2 Insider trading  
While official definitions differ according to country-specific regulations, an insider is 
generally defined as an executive, director, or senior officer of a company or an entity that owns 
a certain percentage of a company’s voting shares. In China, any shareholder holding more than 
5% of a company’s stock is considered a large shareholder and categorized as an insider. Insiders 
may possess an information advantage in different ways. For example, insiders know which 
events will impact stock price, can better assess growth potential and earnings prospects, and 
have a better understanding of their company’s intrinsic value such that they can exploit 
situations when the market over- or undervalues the company. Previous studies based on U.S. 
data unanimously show that insiders are better informed and earn abnormal returns (eg. Jaffe, 
1974; Finnerty, 1976; Rozeff & Zaman, 1988; Seyhun, 2000). As Seyhun (2000) noted, if you 
want to find smart investors, these are the smart investors.  
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The majority of media coverage surrounding insider trading makes it appear as though 
the activity is illegal, though this is not true. When an insider has an information advantage over 
outside investors, there is information asymmetry. Information asymmetry between insiders and 
outside investors is a fundamental issue – its reduction has long been a goal for Chinese 
regulators to advance the cause of an efficient and transparent market. Significant empirical 
research has been dedicated to measuring insider information advantage and the informational 
content of transactions. Easley and O’Hara (1992) expand on Kyle’s (1985) model of imperfect 
competition and insider trading strategy by demonstrating that no-trade can serve as a signal to 
the market maker that there is no new information, prompting a reduction in the bid-ask spread. 
More importantly, Easley and O’Hara (1992) demonstrate that time between trades affects 
spreads and that an absence of trades is correlated with volume. In following works (eg. Easley 
et al, 1996a, b; 1997a, b; Easley et al. 2008), the concept and empirics of the probability of 
informed trading (PIN) is introduced and solidified. This variable is formed from a Bayesian 
market maker perspective as an econometric measure that follows a probabilistic decision tree 
structure to determine bid-ask spreads. Signals throughout a trading period cause spread 
adjustments.  
My study examines prior crash risk – a source of information that is publicly available 
and has the potential to impact share price. Intuitively, ceteris paribus, a firm with higher crash 
risk is a less desirable investment option than one with low crash risk. Given the evidence that 
Chinese insiders can better assess public information and often trade against the market (Zhu, 
Wang, & Yang, 2014), I believe that insiders can similarly assess and utilize publicly available 
crash risk information more effectively than outside investors. Though it may seem intuitive that 
insiders possess an information advantage and that their trades are necessarily conditioned on 
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this advantage, it is sometimes difficult to prove this fact (Beneish & Vargus, 2002). While the 
impact of an insider trade - especially a large one - is noticeable, systems in place to monitor 
insider behaviour may not be effective in determining and corroborating an insider’s motive. In 
particular, insider sales are less informative, less profitable, and more frequent than insider 
purchases (Jeng, Metrick, & Zeckhauser, 2003). While insider purchases signal optimism about 
the firm, sales may be conducted for a number of reasons that preclude the use of private 
information, such as tax benefits (Shefrin & Statman, 1985), need for liquidity, or diversification 
(Lakonishok & Lee, 2001). Ofek and Yermack (2000) demonstrate that executives tend to sell 
existing stock when they receive new grants and options, providing empirical evidence to 
support the notion that sales may be driven by a desire to maintain a balanced portfolio.  
The decision to engage in insider trading is not taken lightly for fear that a legal trade 
may be perceived to be based on private information. Kallunki et al. (2009) find that insiders 
typically avoid selling before bad news earnings announcements to avoid regulatory scrutiny. 
Similarly, Noe (1999) and Huddart et al. (2007) report that insider trading activity increases 
(decreases) after (before) firm earnings are published as legal sanctions are greater for 
transactions that occur ex ante. Applying Becker’s (1968) economics of crime approach to illegal 
insider trading, Thevenot (2012) finds that insiders weigh the perceived financial benefits of a 
transaction against the potential costs of SEC enforcement and private litigation.   
Gunny, Ke, and Zhang (2008) demonstrate that insider trading behavior is systematically 
affected by corporate governance through ownership structure. This affects power and 
information distribution and internal monitoring behaviour, which in turn affects insider motives. 
Dai, Fu, Kang, and Lee (2016) find that corporate governance significantly reduces the 
profitability of insider sales but not purchases. This suggests that well-governed firms reduce 
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insider sales profitability due to the greater legal risk of sales transactions. Furthermore, they find 
that well-governed firms are more likely to introduce ex-ante preventative measures, implement 
such measures more effectively, and are more active in ex-post disciplinary actions. 
There is no consensus on the expected sign for the relationship between the information 
content and the value of a transaction. Many authors expect a positive relationship as highly 
valuable information may motivate insiders to execute larger trades to maximize profit (eg. 
Easley & Ohara, 1987; Eckbo & Smith, 1998). Others provide evidence of a negative 
relationship, anticipating that it is easier to camouflage private information-based trades when 
they are smaller (Marshall, 1974). A study of U.S. insiders concludes that medium-sized trades 
are preferred when a transaction is based on private information (Garfinkel & Nimalendran, 
2003). 
2.3 Causal Relationship 
There are two schools of thought regarding the relationship between crash risk and 
insider trading within Jin and Myers (2006) theory of bad news hoarding. The managerial 
disclosure incentives perspective explores how insider trading influences managerial incentives 
for bad news hoarding, which in turn affects stock price crash risk. This school of thought posits 
that managers have an incentive to hide bad news to create an early exit opportunity to maintain 
the value of their wealth. Hu, Kim, and Zhang (2014) explore the impact of the enactment and 
enforcement of insider trading regulations on crash risk across 48 countries. They find that 
enforcement rather than enactment imposes higher legal costs on insider trading activities, and 
that increasing the costs of insider trading reduces managerial incentives to hide bad news, 
decreasing crash risk. Their research reveals three moderating factors: (1) investor protection; (2) 
information environment; and (3) corporate governance. First, prior research has demonstrated 
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that firms in countries with weaker legal enforcements are more likely to accumulate bad news 
over time, and thus have a greater tendency to experience crashes (Kim et al., 2011b). Stronger 
insider trading law enforcement limits the benefits associated with insider information advantage 
and protects outside investor rights. Second, previous studies show that information opaqueness 
and poor financial reporting quality lead to higher crash risk ((Jin & Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 
2009). Insider trading acts as a disincentive for outside investors to acquire private information 
about the firm (Fishman & Hagerty, 1992) and incentivizes insiders to supply low-quality 
information so that greater benefits can be expropriated (Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006). 
Greater enforcement of insider trading laws improves the information environment and lowers 
crash risk. Third, existing research finds that weak corporate governance facilitates insiders’ 
rent-seeking behaviours, such as engaging in inefficient investments or hiding the bad 
performance of projects until its eventual materialization, which increases crash risk (Bleck & 
Liu, 2007). 
The second perspective predicts that insiders can anticipate a firm’s crash risk and use 
this information when trading. This perspective is consistent with a vast literature documenting 
insiders’ tendency to trade on knowledge of bad news including bankruptcy (Seyhun & Bradley, 
1997), dividend announcements (John & Lang, 1991), disclosures of internal weaknesses 
(Skaife, Veenman, & Wangerin, 2013), SEC enforcement actions (Thevenot, 2012), 
announcements of accounting misstatements (Agrawal & Cooper, 2015), disclosures of negative 
SEC comment letters (Dechow, Lawrence, & Ryans, 2015), breaks in a series of consecutive 
increases in quarterly earnings (Ke, Huddart, & Petroni, 2003), and earnings disappointments 
(Darrough & Rangan, 2005). However, the major issue with this perspective is that the prior 
examples associate insider activity with a bad news event, which exists dichotomously as either 
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having occurred or not occurred. This is more aptly reflected by the effect of stock price crash on 
insider trading, rather than a firm’s stock price crash risk. A potentially improved perspective on 
this causal relationship may posit that bad news hoarding increases firm crash risk, managers 
recognize the increased crash risk and its associated effect of overvaluing stock price, and then 
sell their stocks accordingly. This interpretation does not require a crash to occur for risk-averse 
managers to decrease their stock holdings. The immediate criticism of this interpretation is that 
insider sales can inform the market by acting as a bad news signal, which would lower crash risk 
and reverse the presupposed direction of causality. However, research on the information content 
of insider trades finds that sales are generally less informative due to the number of reasons that 
insiders may sell stock (Lakonishok & Lee, 2001). Therefore, an insider sale may not necessarily 
inform the market and relieve crash risk. Since unseen crash risk decreases the inherent value of 
the stock, insiders profit when the price eventually falls. In the event that the price does not 
crash, the insiders can simply return to their initial holding positions. In a conference paper, He, 
Ren, and Taffler (2016) find evidence that insider sales are positively associated with future 
stock price crash risk. This is consistent with the view that insiders are able to assess and 
anticipate future crash risk and exploit this information advantage to achieve personal trading 
objectives. They also find that this association is stronger in opaque firms and weaker in the 
post-SOX period.  
Due to the contradictory research regarding the causality between crash risk and insider 
trades, I opt to employ prior year crash risk as my independent variable. This creates temporal 
causality and allows me to effectively study how crash risk affects insider trading. The use of 
prior crash risk is superior to future crash risk as it greatly decreases endogeneity concerns. In He 
et al.’s (2016) paper, insiders sell their shares in reaction to anticipated future stock price, with 
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time periods between sale and measured crash risk ranging from 12 to 39 months. The concern is 
that insiders are able to influence crash risk after their sales transactions: some insiders may seek 
to increase their own profits by actively engaging in negative net present value (NPV) projects 
(Bleck & Liu, 2007). The bad performance of negative NPV projects accumulates and eventually 
materializes, which increases crash risk 
2.4 Chinese Stock Market  
The majority of crash risk literature and insider trading literature have focused on the 
U.S. stock market. This study will be one of the first to examine the relationship between crash 
risk and insider trading in an emerging market. Emerging markets feature highly concentrated 
corporate ownership and weak legal institutions. Although emerging markets have introduced 
regulations and laws on insider trading, their enforcement is less effective than developed 
countries, with prosecution rates of only 25% (Bhattacharya & Daouk, 2002). Mexican firms 
demonstrate an extreme result of weak enforcement; Bhattacharya, Daouk, Jorgenson, and Kehr 
(2000) find that corporate news announcements have no impact on stock returns, volatility, trade 
volume, or bid-ask spreads as unrestricted insider trading causes prices to incorporate news 
content before its release.  
China’s A-share market has a number of unique features that make its study rewarding. 
Initially, the A-share market had tradable and non-tradable shares, where executives and large 
shareholders held mostly non-tradable shares. Market reform allowed stakeholders to trade their 
non-tradable shares, but the CSRC introduced lockup periods of one to three years to mitigate 
supply pressure. Since the beginning of 2007, locked up stocks have become gradually tradable. 
The CSRC enacted trading ban regulations on executives in April 2007 and on large shareholders 
in April 2008. Executives are prohibited from trading 10 days before an earnings 
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preannouncements and 30 days before the issuance of a formal financial report. Large 
shareholders with holdings over 30% cannot purchase shares 10 days before an earnings 
preannouncement or formal financial report, and are also banned from selling 30 days before 
semi-annual and annual financial reports. The CSRC regulates that insiders must disclose their 
trading to their firm, which then discloses this information to the CSRC. This information 
includes the volume and date of the trade, as well as the identity and stockholdings of the insider. 
In comparison to developed markets that are mainly composed of institutional investors, 
China’s stock market is dominated by retail investors, who account for over 80% of total trading 
volume (CSRC, 2017). Retail investors have relatively less expertise in collecting and 
interpreting information, giving insiders greater informational advantages, and thus a greater 
incentive to trade. Zhu et al. (2014) argue that Chinese analysts - acting as information 
intermediaries - have yet to mature, providing less insight to reduce information asymmetry. The 
role of corporate governance also plays a crucial role in Chinese insider trading activities. Firstly, 
ownership is highly concentrated into single families or government, providing the structure for 
insiders to take advantage of investors (He, Chong, Li, & Zhang, 2010). Secondly, corporate 
governance affects the motives of insiders to use their information advantage in trading; Zhu and 
Wang (2015) find non-SOE large shareholders engage in more profitable insider trading relative 
to large shareholders in state-owned enterprises due to different informational advantages, profit-
seeking incentives, and risk preferences. The largest shareholders in non-SOEs have highly 
concentrated or controlling ownership stakes due to weak investor protection in the A-share 
market. These shareholders are more active in business operations and have strong incentives to 
monitor managers, resulting in an alignment of interests where both parties can benefit from the 
use of private information. Contrast this to state-owned enterprises where the state delegates 
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bureaucrats, often resulting in poor corporate governance. Since SOE large shareholders rarely 
participate in business operations, they possess little information advantage. Furthermore, Zhu et 
al. (2014) identify executive status as an indicator of insider trading behavior, finding that state-
owned enterprises that are centrally owned in strategically important industries have executives 
who possess “quasi-official” status which allows opportunities for promotion to the provincial or 
ministerial government levels. Promotion is partially based on character and integrity, so 
promotion-track executives are incentivized to avoid profitable insider trading. 
China’s legal framework is poorly equipped to monitor insider trading. Allen, Qian, and 
Qian (2005) find that China’s information disclosure and enforcement system is weak compared 
to developed markets and poor relative to India and Brazil. Ball, Robin, and Wu (2000) 
document that Chinese listed firms lack timely incorporation of economic losses in their 
accounting reports, which they attribute to managers’ and auditors’ low incentive to recognize 
losses in a timely fashion, and the high political and tax influences on financial reporting 
practices. Similarly, Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004) find that financial transparency is 
lower in countries with a high share of state-owned enterprises and in countries where firms are 
more likely to be harmed by revealing sensitive information to competitors or local governments. 
In addition to ineffective monitoring, China also suffers from ineffective enforcement. Weng 
(2014) argues that Article 74’s definition of an insider allows the CSRC unbridled power in 
over- and under-prosecuting individuals, subject to political and public opinion. Secondly, the 
CSRC has two objectives that sometimes conflict. The CSRC is responsible for enforcing 
regulations to protect investors and market integrity, and also has a political duty to protect state 
assets and spread state policy (Shen, 2009). Conflicts arise when enforcement actions may 
negatively impact state assets. Thirdly, China has insufficient resources to enforce insider trading 
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regulations (Duan, 2009). Enforcement is reliant on the CSRC’s administrative actions as the 
legal system offers little protection against insider expropriations (Berkman, Cole, & Fu, 2010). 
Lastly, the CSRC has limited power in terms of barring illegal insiders from attaining new 
director or officer positions. In general, neither the People’s Procuratorates nor the People’s 
Court find insider trading to be a serious crime. Cases have only been prosecuted when 
connected to bribery and corruption charges (Cheng, 2008). China’s opaque disclosure 
environment and weak law enforcement significantly reduce the cost for insiders to trade on 
private information. 
China’s securities market employs a price-limit designed to reduce crash risk. The 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) implements a 10% limit on daily price fluctuation for stocks, 
with a 5% limit for special treatment stocks (SSE, 2017). These rules are popular in emerging 
markets with a large fraction of retail investors as they enable a time-out period during large 
price movements and serve as a market stabilization mechanism. Using a game-theoretic 
framework, Deb et al. (2010) provide an explanation for why regulators use daily price-limit 
rules even though many empirical and theoretical studies criticize their usefulness: in a market 
prone to price manipulations and characterized by high monitoring costs, price-limit rules 
increase monitoring efficiency. The imposition of these rules is positively associated with 
countries that incur higher monitoring costs due to poorer business disclosure, higher corruption 
levels, and lower efficiency in the legal, regulatory, and technological environments.  
3. Hypothesis Development 
There is a plethora of evidence to suggest that insiders trade on bad news. For example, 
prior studies have examined how insiders react to bankruptcies (Seyhun & Bradley, 1997), SEC 
enforcement actions (Thevenot, 2012), breaks in a series of consecutive increases in quarterly 
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earnings (Ke et al., 2003), and earnings disappointments (Darrough & Rangan, 2005). Prior 
research provides an inconsistent expected relationship between trade value and insider 
information. Highly valuable information may motivate larger trades that maximize profit, but 
larger trades naturally attract more regulatory attention and increase an insider’s legal jeopardy. 
Pursuant with the logic that insiders view prior crash risk as bad news, I anticipate a positive 
relationship between prior period crash risk and insider sales value. Seyhun (2000) demonstrates 
that sales value increases with firm size so I divide the value of the trade with the market value 
of the firm to obtain sales value percentage.  
Hypothesis 1A: Insider sales value percentage is positively associated with prior year crash risk. 
An alternative argument can be made that an insider may believe that a stock price has 
reached its minimum level during a crash and will begin to rise. In this scenario, an insider will 
purchase additional shares or hold on to existing shares following a period of crash risk and the 
expected relationship between prior year crash risk and sales value percentage is negative. To 
explore this relationship further, I subsample my crash risk measures into “high” and “low” 
groups based on median crash risk. For the high crash risk group, I anticipate that insiders will be 
more likely to sell shares as the risk of further stock price crash does not justify buying or 
holding. Inversely, I anticipate insiders will be more likely to hold on to existing shares when 
crash risk is low in order to capitalize on a perceived undervalued stock. 
Hypothesis 1B: The relationship between insider sales value percentage and prior year crash risk 
is stronger in the high crash risk groups and weaker in the low crash risk groups. 
A complete examination of the relationship between insider trading and prior crash risk 
requires that stock purchases also be assessed. An analysis that considers value conditional on a 
sale may overstate sales value. To address this issue, I aggregate insider trade value at the firm-
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year level. Prior research documents insiders as contrarian traders (eg. Seyhun, 1992; Jenter, 
2005; Piotroski & Roulstone, 2005). Insiders using this strategy tend to trade against prevailing 
market trends by purchasing stocks when they are performing poorly and selling them when their 
performance improves. Averaging the actions of sufficiently many managers provides a more 
valid signal about insider trading decisions (Baker & Wurgler, 2000), whereas individual beliefs 
about misvaluation may be determined by hierarchical access to observable information. Since 
sales are still the transaction of interest, I measure net insider sales as total sale value minus total 
purchase value on a firm-year level and anticipate that an increase in prior crash risk leads to an 
overall increase in current net sales value. 
Hypothesis 2: Net insider sales value is positively associated with prior year crash risk. 
Corporate governance has a systematic effect on insider trading behaviour (Gunny et al., 
2008). Firstly, ownership structure affects the distribution of control between shareholders and 
executives, which affects information advantage for specific insiders. Secondly, different 
corporate governance structures monitor insider behaviour differently, which affects an insider’s 
motive and likelihood to use their information advantage in trading. Zhu et al. (2014) find that 
insider transactions in non-SOEs are more predictive of market returns than insider transactions 
in SOEs due to different profit motivations and a greater involvement in business operations. 
Additionally, the monitoring effect of large shareholders in non-SOEs is mitigated by an 
alignment of incentives between large shareholders and managers. Furthermore, non-SOE 
insiders face less regulatory scrutiny than SOE insiders. Due to this hidden but strong 
administrative control, executives in SOEs are less motivated to use information to trade 
profitably. These factors indicate that insiders within an SOE observe unique restrictions and 
motivations, and are less likely to be influenced by prior crash risk when trading their shares. 
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Hypothesis 3: The relationship between insider sales value percentage and prior crash risk is less 
pronounced in state-owned enterprises. 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1  Data 
 All purchase and sale transactions analyzed in this study are taken from the Chinese 
Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. These records include stock code, 
name and position of insider, trade date, shareholding volume before and after trade, number of 
shares traded, average trading price, and reason for trade. My analysis covers all disclosed A-
share insider trades from listed firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange from April 1st, 2010 to 
March 31st, 2015, corresponding with Chinese fiscal year 2010 to 2015. I begin my analysis from 
2010 to allow a three year gap from the 2007 market reform legalizing insider trading, in order to 
limit large-scale diversification sales. The CSMAR database also includes shareholder equity 
structure, which allows me to calculate my value percentage variable. 
Following Pettit and Venkatesh (1995), I exclude individual transactions exceeding 
$1000,000USD (or ¥6,670,000) as they often have different motivations than the trades I are 
concerned with and sometimes serve as informational events themselves. These trades are 
eliminated to maintain reasonable homogeneity in the trades analyzed. I also eliminate trades 
lacking sufficient information to calculate my dependent variables. In total, I eliminate 961 
trades (363 for large trade value, 598 for lacking information) or 18.5% of my initial sample. 
Summary statistics on the number and value of all insider transactions are given in Table 1. In 
total, there are for 4134 transactions across the five year sample period, of which 1911 are 
purchase transactions and 2223 are sales transactions. Market value is measured as the A-share 
value of equity in the month of the insider transaction. The 338 SSE-listed firms I study over the 
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60 month period feature an average individual sale value of ¥1,042,147 and an average firm-year 
net sales value of ¥4,880,507.  
I collect my crash risk data from the CSMAR database which provides daily stock 
returns, industry information, and financial statements. Modifying the guidelines from Xu et al. 
(2013), which relies on weekly stock return data, I exclude (1) firms with fewer than 150 days of 
stock return data, (2) non-A-share stocks, (3) financial services firms, and (4) firm-year 
observations with insufficient financial data to calculate control variables.  
I collect my shareholder data from CSMAR and categorize firms as state-owned 
enterprises when the ultimate controlling shareholder is the state. For all other firms, I classify 
them as non-SOEs.  
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Individual Insider Transactions 
Sale and purchase transactions are separated. Market value is measured in the month of the 
insider transaction and is reported in units of CNY 1000. All transactions exceeding ¥6,670,000 
have been excluded. *Negative values in the volume and trade value rows correspond with sales 
transactions. On average, the value of an individual sale exceeds that of a purchase. This 
relationship is inversed for volume, indicating that more shares were purchased than sold during 
my sample period. This indicates that insiders tend to sell shares when price is relatively high 
and purchase shares when price is relatively low. 
 Min. Max. Mean Median SD 
Sales 
volume 
10 1,800,000 85,184 33,000 136,050 
Purchase 
volume 
91 1,850 116.473 33,000 204,100 
Volume* -1,800,000 1,850,000 7,914 -2,250 198,240 
Number of 
shares 
25,740 69,920,000 1,303,000 563,200 3,072,427 
Price 1.58 73.87 13.20 11.25 8.83 
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Sales value 169 6,617,956 1,042,147 495,300 1,338,180 
Purchase 
value 
584 6,598,800 797,924 298.662 1,165,660 
Trade value -6,617,956 6,598,800 -192,645 -32,100 1,559,690 
Market 
value 
291,377 571,962,285 11,437,954 6,450,439 17,630 
 
4.2  Insider Trading Variables 
4.2.1  Sales Value Percentage 
Trade value is trade volume multiplied by stock price. Transactions are subset into sales 
and purchases, since sales transactions are my variable of interest. I define value as the renminbi 
value in thousands. I calculate trade value percentage by dividing trade value by firm market 
value in the most recent monthly period. My constructed variable is SALES VP, which reports 
the size of an individual transaction as a percentage of total market value. I report an absolute 
value for SALES VP so an increase in the variable corresponds with an increase in sales value as 
a percentage of total market value. SALES VP is similar to the trade value variable used by 
Huddart and Ke (2007), though they report a transformed trade value while I scale trade value 
with respect to firm size. Scaling with firm size allows me to control the effects of large trades 
driven by a large number of outstanding firm shares. This scaling is different from the 
STOCKHOLDING control variable discussed later on, which only controls for specific insider 
share holdings rather than firm size. Alternatively, firm size can be controlled for by 
implementing a firm size control variable. 
4.2.2  Net Sales Value 
Prior literature has used aggregate insider trading measures extensively as a 
comprehensive firm-level indicator (eg. Lakonishok & Lee, 2001; Huddart & Ke, 2007; Zhu et 
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al., 2014). My aggregate measure follows Huddart and Ke (2007) by using trade value rather 
than trade volume. Aggregated trade value allows me to incorporate price into my model as price 
movements are a significant determinant in both insider trading decisions and crash risk. Net 
sales value is aggregated on a firm-year level as the difference between sales and purchases. My 
sample consists of 588 firm-years with 329 net sale firm-years, 256 net purchase firm-years, and 
three net zero firm-years. I also aggregate net sales for six-month periods (NETSALE6) and refer 
to them as firm-half-years. The half-year periods are measured from April 1 to September 31 and 
October 1 to March 31. This sample consists of 722 observations with 430 net sale firm half 
years, 290 net purchase firm half years, and two net zero firm half years. Table 2 reports the 
summary statistics of my dependent variables.  
4.2.3 Probability of Informed Trading  
There are a number of insider trading measures found in the literature that were not 
employed, including net purchase ratio (NPR), profitability, and information content. None of 
these measures are especially appropriate as a dependent variable when the predictor variable is 
stock price crash risk. Two mechanisms are crucial for my dependent variable: firstly, it must be 
able to measure individual insider transactions; secondly, it must capture insider sales since sales 
are the theoretically anticipated response to increased crash risk. With this in mind, NPR is 
precluded since it only measures net insider activity. For Hypothesis 2, I opt to use a net insider 
measure that is a simple aggregate of individual activity in lieu of NPR since introducing a ratio 
would add an unnecessary operator. I do not measure profitability since I do not have access to 
the data necessary to calculate abnormal and expected returns. PIN is one measure of 
information content found in insider literature. I do not use PIN or information content since they 
are not the variable of interest for this research. My focus is on how insiders change their selling 
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activities, not the amount of private information contained in an insider transaction. Since prior 
year stock price crash risk is publicly available information, the use of information content as a 
dependent variable seems paradoxical.  
4.3  Crash Risk Variables 
Prior literature examining crash risk calculates non-overlapping six month or twelve 
month measures by using firm-specific daily or weekly returns (eg. Xu et al., 2013; Callen & 
Fang, 2015). Chen et al. (2001) find that more frequent measurement periods lead to greater 
measurement error due to the strong influence of outliers on skewness. My study differs from 
extant research since I employ crash risk as an explanatory variable. Thus, I calculate 
overlapping month-specific crash risk measures based on twelve-month measurement periods. 
This approach yields a crash risk measure per month of study, which allows me to more 
accurately interpret the relationship between crash risk and the insider trading variables.  
I construct three measures of crash risk following Chen et al. (2001) and Xu et al. (2013). 
First, I estimate firm-specific daily returns, denoted by D, as the natural log of one plus the 
residual return from the expanded market model regression for each firm and year: 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝐵𝐵1𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−2+ 𝐵𝐵2𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝐵𝐵3𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+  𝐵𝐵4𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1+ 𝐵𝐵5𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+2 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   (1) 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the return on stock i in day t and 𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 is the value-weighted A-share market return 
for day t. Following Dimson (1979), I correct for non-synchronous trading by including lead and 
lag terms for the market index. The firm-specific daily returns for firm i on day t are represented 
by 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 = ln (1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) where 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the residual in Eq. (1).  
4.3.1  COUNT 
The first crash risk measure, COUNT, is the difference between the number of firm-
specific daily returns exceeding 3.09 standard deviations below and above the mean firm-
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specific return over the fiscal year, with 3.09 chosen to generate frequencies of 0.1% in the 
normal distribution (Hutton et al., 2009). COUNT is downside frequencies minus upside 
frequencies – a higher value of COUNT corresponds to a higher frequency of crashes.  
4.3.2  NCSKEW 
The second measure of crash risk is the negative conditional skewness of firm-specific 
daily returns over the fiscal year (NCSKEW). NCSKEW is computed as the negative third 
moment of each stock’s firm-specific returns, divided by the cubed standard deviation. 
Specifically, for each firm i in year t, I calculate NCSKEW as: 







          (2) 
where n is the number of observations of firm-specific daily returns and 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 represents the 
sequence of de-meaned daily returns. The denominator is a normalization factor (Greene, 2008). 
Generally, NCSKEW data does not use any firm that has more than five missing observations. 
NCSKEW uses a negative sign in front of the third moment for simpler interpretation (Chen et 
al., 2001) - an increase in NCSKEW equates to a greater risk of crash.  
4.3.3  DUVOL  
The third measure of crash risk is the down-to-up volatility measure (DUVOL) of return 
asymmetries, which does not use third moments and is thus less likely to be influenced by 
extremely negative returns (Chen et al., 2001). DUVOL is computed by separating all days as 
returns below the fiscal year mean (“down” days) and above the fiscal year mean (“up” days). 
The standard deviation of daily returns is calculated for each of these subsamples. DUVOL is the 
natural log of the ratio of the standard deviation in the “down” days to the standard deviation of 










         (3) 
where 𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢 is the number of “up” days and 𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 is the number of “down” days. A higher value of 
DUVOL indicates greater crash risk.  
Among the three measures, COUNT is the most direct measure of firm crash risk and is 
used most frequently in the crash risk literature. NCSKEW and DUVOL are valuable because 
COUNT cannot capture stock price crashes in scenarios where a firm gradually releases bad 
news such that stock price declines consistently and plateaus. In said circumstance, the stock 
price would still exhibit negative conditional return skewness and high down-to-up volatility. 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the crash risk measures, calculated from daily stock 
return data and based on twelve-month measurement periods. 
Kim and Zhang (2014) introduced the option implied volatility smirk as a proxy for crash 
risk. The smirk refers to when the same underlying instrument has a higher implied volatility for 
out-of-the-money (OTM) puts than for at-the-money (ATM) calls. Logically, traders require 
greater premiums for higher implied volatility due to the increased crash risk of OTM puts. Kim 
and Zhang (2014) measure implied volatility skew as the difference between ATM and OTM 
option volatilities. I chose not to use implied volatility smirk as a crash risk measure for two 
reasons: (1) the majority of crash risk literature relies on Chen et al’s (2001) measures, which are 
direct measures based on stock return data while implied volatility is less direct, and (2) from a 




4.4  Control Variables 
4.4.1  Volatility of Trading Volume 
In Kyle’s (1985) model of imperfect competition, insider trading strategy is affected by 
the variance of uninformed trading volume. When this variance is smaller, the market maker 
assumes that imbalanced buy and sell orders are more likely due to informed trades. In order to 
limit informed trades, the market maker adjusts price accordingly. When this variance increases, 
the assumption is that the imbalance is due to random variation in uninformed trading and the 
associated price adjustment is smaller. I control for volume volatility, SDVOL, calculated as the 
standard deviation of monthly trading volume over A-shares outstanding estimated over the 
fiscal period (Huddart & Ke, 2007). The sample mean of SDVOL is 0.2118 and the median is 
0.1595. 
4.4.2  Momentum 
Rozeff and Zaman (1988) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) both document that insiders’ 
trades are related to past stock returns, though the directionality is unclear due to differences in 
investing strategy. I control for MOMENTUM, the six-month compounded buy and hold return 
ending on the day before the insiders’ trade date. A positive relationship between my dependent 
variables and MOMENTUM, where an insider sells (buys) stocks when prices have risen (fallen), 
may indicate the presence of inside information or simply contrarian strategy. The mean and 
median of MOMENTUM  are 0.0984 and 0.0065 respectively. These values correspond to a 
return rate of 9.84% and 0.65%. 
4.4.3  Stockholdings 
Insiders often cite portfolio diversification and rebalancing as reasons for trading stock. 
Ofek and Yermack (2000) show that insiders tend to sell stock when they receive new stock 
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options. Larger trades are likely to be associated with larger insider stock holdings. I calculate 
STOCKHOLDINGS as a percentage of total A-shares outstanding and anticipate that it is 
positively related to SALES VP. Since this variable is calculated on an individual basis, I 
construct STOCKHOLDINGSFY and STOCKHOLDINGSFHY when my dependent variable is 
net sales to control for firm-year and firm-half-year stockholdings.  
4.5  Models 
I examine each hypothesis with its own set of regressions. My first hypothesis measures 
the association between prior period crash risk and sales value percentage:  
𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝐵𝐵1𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡−1 +  𝐵𝐵2𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵3𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡 +
𝐵𝐵4𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡 + ∈𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡         (4) 
where 𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡 is the sales value percentage for an insider transaction conducted by an 
individual y for stock i at time t. 𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡−1 is one of my crash risk measures, where t-1 
indicates I calculate prior year crash risk. SDVOL, MOMENTUM, and STOCKHOLDINGS are 
my control variables. Based on hypothesis 1A, I expect B1 to be positive and significant. 
 Hypothesis 1B separates crash risk into “high” and “low” groups and then performs the 
same regression as H1. I categorize crash risk as “high” if the value is above the median and 
“low” if it is below the median. My median crash risk is calculated from my crash risk sample 
which contains 61,828 observations rather than my smaller insider trading and crash risk sample. 
Calculating median values from the smaller sample would not accurately reflect a firm’s crash 
risk since observations are contingent on a trade having occurred. 




𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝐵𝐵1𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +  𝐵𝐵2𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵3𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝐵𝐵4𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ∈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡         (5)  
where 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is an aggregate of total trade value for firm i for measurement period t, 
which is either a fiscal year or a fiscal half-year. My approach with 𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶ℎ remains unchanged 
from hypothesis 1A. I adjust STOCKHOLDINGS to a firm-year or firm-half-year level to 
account for the variable in aggregate. From hypothesis 2, I anticipate B2 to be positive and 
significant. 
My third hypothesis examines the impact of corporate governance on the insider trading 
– crash risk relationship. Specifically, I examine whether the observed relationship is weaker 
within state-owned enterprises compared to non-SOEs. Within my sample, I categorize a 
company as state-owned when the ultimate shareholder is the state and classify it as a non-SOE 
when it is not.  
𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝐵𝐵1𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡−1 +  𝐵𝐵2𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵3𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡 +
𝐵𝐵4𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡 +  𝐵𝐵5𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵6𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ∈𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡   (6) 
where Crash * SOE is my interaction term measuring the impact of company status on crash 
risk’s effect on insider sales. Based on hypothesis 3, I expect B5 to be negative and significant, 
indicating that SOE status attenuates the crash risk – insider trading relationship. 
Since a single stock can be traded upon numerous times within a measuring period, some 
stocks in my sample contribute many data points. I account for this non-independence by using a 
generalized linear mixed-effects model (GLMM) which allows me to delineate my variables into 
random and fixed effects. GLMM generates independence by removing stock and year 
autocorrelation. Since my initial data is temporally autocorrelated, my random effects approach 
neutralizes individual stock price differences without removing a degree of freedom while my 
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fixed effects allow me to test my dependent variables. My model computes Satterthwaite’s 
(1946) effective degrees of freedom and applies this to perform Welch’s t-test (1947). One 
advantage of Welch’s t-test over the more common Student’s t-test is its robustness given 
unequal sample sizes and variances between groups. I report Nakagawa and Schielzeth’s (2013) 
R2 values. Marginal R2 represents variance explained by fixed factors while conditional R2 
represents variance explained by both fixed and random factors.  
5. Empirical Analysis 
Table 2 displays the summary statistics of the variables of interest in my study. The 
average percentage value of an insider sale is about 0.0173% of firm value. Based on mean firm 
value from Table 1, this corresponds to a renminbi value of ¥1,978,766. The mean values for my 
net sale variables indicate that insiders primarily sought to sell shares in any given firm-year. I 
measure crash risk using COUNT, NCSKEW, and DUVOL – greater values correspond with a 
greater degree of crash risk. An average individual insider holds approximately 1.5% of a firm’s 
shares. MOMENTUM captures the six-month raw return of a stock prior to an insider trade; my 
results report an average return of 9.842%. Lastly, SDVOL captures the volatility of trading 
volume over A-shares and I report an average value of 0.2118. This figure is quite large due to 
the dominance of retail investors in the trading space as greater trading volume from uninformed 







Table 2: Summary Statistics of Crash Risk and Insider Trading Variables 
My sample period consists of 2223 sales transactions, 588 firm-years, and 722 firm-half-years. 
NETSALE and NETSALE6 are reported in units of CNY 1000. SALES VP is reported as a 
percentage of total firm value. 
 1st Qu. Median  Mean    3rd Qu. SD 
SALES VP 0.0020 0.0063 0.0173 0.0180 0.03233 
NETSALE  -5,379.85 39.422 15,386.749 17,167.351 64,809.020 
NETSALE6  -4,474.54 89.938 7,594.878 12,308.590 53,602.383 
COUNTm,t-1 0 0 -0.04554 0 0.48578 
NCSKEWm,t-1 -0.04657 -0.00453 -0.00032 0.04101 0.06960 
DUVOLm,t-1 -0.77454 -0.09321 -0.04580 0.57722 1.04657 
STOCKHOLDING 0.00002 0.000373 0.015035 0.00242 0.10972 
MOMENTUM -0.1376 0.0417 0.09842 0.28015 0.35646 
SDVOL 0.084848 0.159476 0.211795 0.262959  
 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for my explanatory, response, and control 
variables. The results demonstrate strong correlations among crash risk measures  (p<0.01), 
which is similar to prior studies (eg. Chen et al., 2001; Callen & Fang, 2015). For comparison, 
Callen and Fang’s correlation matrix show NCSKEW*DUVOL = 0.90, CRASH*NCSKEW = 
0.49, and CRASH*DUVOL = 0.69 while my matrix for the respective combinations are 0.91, 
0.59, and 0.52.  
The highly significant and positive relationships SDVOL-STOCKHOLDING and SDVOL-
MOMENTUM were theoretically expected, as was the lack of significance between 
STOCKHOLDING-MOMENTUM. Among dependent variables, the correlation between 
NETSALE and NETSALE6 is 0.86 (p<0.01) was anticipated, as they capture the same data but 




Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
Table 3 reports the month-specific crash risk measures used in my first two hypotheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** report 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 COUNTm,t-1 DUVOLm,t-1 NCSKEWm,t-1 MOMENTUM SDVOL STOCKHOLDINGS NETSALE 
DUVOLm,t-1 0.52***       
NCSKEWm,t-1 0.59*** 0.91***      
MOMENTUM -0.01 -0.01 0.01     
SDVOL -0.05*** -0.04** -0.03* 0.07***    
STOCKHOLDINGS -0.20*** -0.04** -0.05** -0.01 0.12**   
NETSALE -0.03** 0.03* 0.02 0.10*** -0.09*** -0.03**  








5.1  Regression Results 
Table 4 presents the regression results of hypotheses 1 and 2, examining the effect of 
prior year crash risk on the different measures of insider trading activity. Table 4 shows how 
individual insider trading and aggregated firm-year and firm-half-year insider trading responds to 
crash risk after controlling for firm-specific characteristics. The estimated coefficients are all 
significantly positive for my first response variable, SALES VP, confirming the positive effect of 
crash risk on the value of an individual insider’s sale. Prior year DUVOL has the strongest 
association with SALES VP (t-statistic = 5.216). The corresponding estimated coefficient is 
0.00031 and mean sales value is 0.0173%, so an increase in prior year down-to-up volatility by 
one standard deviation (1.04657) corresponds with a 0.00031∗1.04657
0.0173
 =1.875% increase in mean 
sales value. NCSKEW has a similarly strong association (t-statistic = 4.064) and while its 
associated coefficient is higher than DUVOL (0.00354), the mean and standard deviation of 
NCSKEW are much lower. An increase in NCSKEW by one standard deviation (0.0696) yields an 
increase in average insider sales value of 1.424%. With the weakest association (t-statistic = 
2.545), COUNT yields an estimated coefficient of 0.00029. An increase in COUNT by one 
standard deviation (0.48578) increases average insider sales value by 0.814. Based on the 
average sales value (¥1,042.147) found in Table 1, a one standard deviation increase in prior year 
crash risk may result in individual insiders increasing a single sale transaction by up to ¥19,540. 
Therefore, the effect of prior crash risk on insider sales value is not only statistically significant, 
but also economically meaningful. 
I note that SDVOL is insignificant in my SALES VP regressions yet highly significant in 
NETSALE and NETSALE6. This result is somewhat surprising as Kyle’s (1985) model of 
imperfect competition explains that insider trading strategy is influenced by net stock volume 
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variance. One explanation is that my regression is conditioned on an insider’s decision to sell, so 
the only strategic decision is the volume of shares. Testing the relationship on all trades 
(untabulated) rather than only sale transactions finds SDVOL to have a significant impact on 
trade value as a percentage of total market value (p<0.01). A third test using raw sales value 
finds SDVOL has minimal influence, indicating that SDVOL is valuable in determining an 
insider’s decision to buy or sell but less so in terms of the amount they intend to trade. My results 
from my aggregated trade value regressions are qualitatively similar to Huddart and Ke (2007). 
Overall, my results demonstrate that SDVOL has a significant and negative effect on insider 
sales. The influence of MOMENTUM on the aggregate trade value variables follows my 
predictions based on prior research (Rozeff & Zaman, 1988). The positive directionality 
demonstrates the tendency for insiders to sell (buy) when stock prices steadily increase 
(decrease) over a prior six month period. This contrarian trading behaviour is well documented 
within insider literature (eg. Seyhun, 1992; Lakonishok & Lee, 2001; Jenter, 2005). Fama and 
French (1988) find that a portion of insider profits may due to contrarian trading, due to the 
mean-reverting nature of stock returns. MOMENTUM’s larger impact on NETSALE6 seems to 
indicate that insiders time their trading decisions, choosing to sell their positions within the 
initial six months of increasing stock price. Typical insiders are over-exposed to their firms’ 
idiosyncratic risk due to compensation in the form of stock options which cannot be traded or 
hedged, and the intimate linkage between their human capital value and firm performance 
(Malmendier & Tate, 2002). This under-diversification requires that risk-averse insiders exercise 
their options early given a sufficiently high stock price (Lambert, Larcker, & Verrecchia, 1991). 
Insiders with less risk-aversion are more likely to hold on to their shares or purchase new shares. 
The effect of MOMENTUM on SALES VP is significant at 5% and the negative directionality 
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implies that individual insiders’ sales value increases when stock prices have decreased in the 
preceding six months. Prior studies researching the relationship between momentum and insider 
behaviour focus on aggregate insider trades and reveal contrarian tendencies. My study reveals 
how individual insiders choose to offload their shares when the firm has performed poorly, 
which is an indicator that these insiders do not apply contrarian strategy.  
As anticipated, an individual insider’s stockholdings has a significant and positive 
influence (p<0.001) on the volume and value of shares he chooses to sell. Testing this on raw 
sales value yields qualitatively similar results. Expanding the sample to include both purchase 
and sale transactions reduces the impact of stockholding, which provides support for Ofek and 
Yermack’s (2000) conclusion that insider sales are driven by a need to rebalance and diversify 
portfolios. STOCKHOLDINGS has a negative and significant relationship with NETSALE and 
NETSALE6. This relationship may be influenced by certain factors specific to the aggregate 
variable - in scenarios where an insider makes a first-time purchase; their STOCKHOLDING 
value is zero, down-weighting the variable. When I examine the effect of aggregate stockholding 
on a sample where net sales are positive, I find the stockholding variable to be significantly 
positive with a very large t-value (55.393). This finding confirms that STOCKHOLDINGS is a 
significant influencer in insider sales transactions but not purchase transactions. 
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Table 4: Regression Results for Hypothesis 1A and 2 
NETSALE and NETSALE6 column values are reported in units of CNY 1000. STOCKHOLDING is an aggregated firm-year and firm-
half-year value for NETSALE and NETSALE6, respectively. T-values are included in brackets. I include both year and industry fixed 
effects. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: COUNTm, t-1 
 SALES VP NETSALE  NETSALE6 
Intercept 0.00127*** (5.621) 10,382.03* (1.83) 4613.48 (1.659) 
COUNTm, t-1 0.00029** (2.545) -10,329.98*** (-5.83) -6453.79*** (-5.153) 
MOMENTUM -0.00043** (-2.467) 8,371.82*** (2.92) 18,934.05***(7.348) 
SDVOL 0.00056 (1.011) -35,466.76*** (-5.29) -26,581.76*** (-4.558) 
STOCKHOLDING 0.03059*** (11.063) -9,033.35*** (-15.01) -5,842.43*** (-17.482) 
N 2230 588 722 
Marginal R2 8.567% 10.359% 7.431% 









Panel B: NCSKEWm,t-1 
 SALES VP NETSALE NETSALE6 
Intercept 0.00128***(5.802) 11,299.10* (1.926) 5,116.27* (1.82) 
NCSKEWm t-1 0.00354*** (4.064) -113.30 (-0.009) -7152.26 (-0.84) 
MOMENTUM -0.00049***(-2.890) 8,230.40*** (2.849) 18,841.06*** (7.306) 
SDVOL 0.00052 (0.962) -36,714.30*** (-5.453) -27,107.47*** (-4.664) 
STOCKHOLDING 0.03030***(10.982) -8,483.70***(-14.2) -5,558.11*** (-16.825) 
N 2230 588 722 
Marginal R2 8.653% 9.843% 7.261% 
Conditional R2 51.964% 58.988% 51.326% 
 
Panel C: DUVOLm, t-1 
 SALES VP NETSALE NETSALE6 
Intercept 0.00130***(5.95) 11,346.15* (1.927) 5,219.91* (1.850) 
DUVOLm t-1 0.00031*** (5.216) 300.39 (0.347) 245.98 (0.7669) 
MOMENTUM -0.00050*** (-2.978) 8,164.56*** (2.824) 18,716.07*** (7.244) 
SDVOL 0.00053 (-0.979) -36,746.26*** (-5.46) -27,212.96*** (-4.689) 
STOCKHOLDING 0.02971*** (10.802) -8,476.50*** (-14.182) -5,554.03*** (-16.805) 
N 2230 588 722 
Marginal R2 9.042% 9.844% 7.220% 
Conditional R2 51.880% 58.991% 51.323% 
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Table 5 examines the crash risk – insider trading relationship when I categorize crash risk 
into high and low subsamples. For all three crash risk measures, I see that the observed 
relationship is positive and significant when crash risk is high and insignificant when crash risk 
is low. My reasoning is that high crash risk presents bad news that insiders may believe to be 
unmanageable, thus representing an untenable degree of risk. The rational response to high crash 
risk is to offload shares and mitigate firm-specific exposure. In low crash risk scenarios, insiders 
have greater control over the leakage of bad news and can better time their trades to take 
advantage of crash risk exposure. Specifically, an insider may anticipate share price to revert to 
the mean and will hold on to their shares until then. 
The results for my second hypothesis regarding aggregated insider transactions are less 
conclusive. Though COUNT has a significant effect on NETSALE and NETSALE6, the 
directionality of the crash risk measure is not in line with my hypothesis. An additional test using 
CRASH, a dummy variable that equals 1 if COUNT is greater than 0, yields qualitatively similar 
results. The directionality of the influence of NCSKEW and DUVOL on aggregate trade value is 
positive, though their impact is quantitatively insignificant. I believe that these inconclusive 
results may be due to sample size as my sample only has 588 firm-years and 722 firm-half-years, 
compared to 4142 individual transactions. Ignoring the possible sample size effects, H2 
combines both purchases and sales while H1 focuses solely on sales transactions. As 
demonstrated in Table 5, the level of crash risk also affects how much stock an insider sells, 
indicating that individual insiders demonstrate unique levels of risk tolerance. Additionally, 
individual insiders may also interpret firm crash risk differently due to unequal access to 
information. This is consistent with the “information hierarchy” as suggested by the evidence in 
Seyhun (2000), who finds that higher-level executives possess better information about the firm. 
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Overall, these aspects combine to form significant noise in my findings, which may contribute to 
my  inconclusive results. I also test H2 using aggregate insider transactions on a monthly basis 
and net sales value as a percentage of firm value but find similarly inconclusive results. This 




Table 5: Regression Results for Hypothesis 1B: High and Low Crash Risk Groups  
Table 5 splits crash risk into high and low groups based on median values from my crash risk sample and examines the association 
between high (low) crash risk and SALES VP. T-values are included in brackets. I include both year and industry fixed effects. The 
superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: COUNTm, t-1 
 High Crash Risk Low Crash Risk 
 Sales VP Sales VP 
Intercept 0.01732*** (4.453) 0.01158*** (4.216) 
COUNTm, t-1 0.00724*** (2.809) 0.00171 (1.307) 
MOMENTUM -0.00437 (-1.593) -0.00521** (-2.132) 
SDVOL -0.00274 (-0.270) 0.00845 (1.097) 
STOCKHOLDING 0.27011*** (7.36) 0.44810*** (8.654) 
Marginal R2 9.0354% 9.2449% 
Conditional R2 64.109% 50.4973% 









Panel B: NCSKEWm, t-1 
 High Crash Risk Low Crash Risk 
 Sales VP Sales VP 
Intercept 0.01488*** (4.472) 0.00937*** (2.840) 
NCSKEWm, t-1 0.03219*** (2.806) 0.00777 (0.554) 
MOMENTUM -0.00615** (-2.412) -0.00495* (-1.88) 
SDVOL 0.01268 (1.321) 0.01416* (1.800) 
STOCKHOLDING 0.24910*** (7.484) 0.60950*** (9.602) 
Marginal R2 8.5851% 12.4833% 
Conditional R2 58.0339% 56.8593% 
N 1032 1157 
Panel C: DUVOLm, t-1 
 High Crash Risk Low Crash Risk 
 Sales VP Sales VP 
Intercept 0.01538*** (4.092) 0.01024*** (4.375) 
DUVOLm, t-1 0.00258*** (3.516) 0.00046 (0.449) 
MOMENTUM -0.00630** (2.598) -0.00387 (-1.636) 
SDVOL 0.01354 (1.405) 0.00748 (1.168) 
STOCKHOLDING 0.29940*** (7.689) 0.53970*** (0.243) 
Marginal R2 8.5938% 0.177755 
Conditional R2 69.6322% 0.306461 
N 937 1252 
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Table 6 present the results of hypothesis 3, where I examine the impact of SOE status on 
the crash risk – insider trading relationship. For my first crash risk measure, COUNT, SOE status 
has little impact on the strength of the crash risk – SALES VP relation. I attribute this to the 
categorical nature of COUNT such that differences based on SOE status are not adequately 
captured. In my NCSKEW and DUVOL measures, the relationship between crash risk and SALES 
VP is significantly weaker for state-owned enterprises than non-SOEs. This confirms my 
hypothesis on the effects of corporate governance on insider trading behaviour. Specifically, the 
insiders in SOEs are less involved in business operations (Zhu et al., 2014) which lowers their 
ability to make informative trades. Additionally, the “quasi-official” status of SOE insiders 
reduces their motivation to trade profitably – even if they have the knowledge to do so – as they 
face greater regulatory scrutiny and risk promotion opportunities.  
For all regressions, I find variance inflation factors (VIF) to be less than 2, suggesting 
that multicollinearity does not pose a serious problem in my results (O'Brien, 2007).  
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Table 6: Regression Results for Hypothesis 3: Moderating Effect of SOE Status  
Table 6 features both the individual and interaction effects of SOE status. Hypothesis 3 focuses on the interacting effect of SOE status 
on the relationship between crash risk and sales value percentage. My sample includes 3915 observations with 1539 SOEs and 2376 
non-SOEs. T-values are included in brackets. I include both year and industry fixed effects. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: COUNTm, t-1 
Intercept 0.01707*** (6.355)  
COUNTm t-1 0.00302** (2.392) 
MOMENTUM -0.00413** (-2.331) 
SDVOL 0.00595 (1.073) 
STOCKHOLDING 0.28930*** (10.556) 
SOE -0.00970*** (-3.031) 
COUNTm t-1*SOE -0.00104 (-0.339) 
Marginal R2 10.191% 









Panel B: NCSKEWm, t-1 
Intercept 0.01715*** (6.496) 
NCSKEWm t-1 0.04414*** (4.376) 
MOMENTUM -0.00478*** (-2.473) 
SDVOL 0.00613 (1.114) 
STOCKHOLDING 0.28540*** (10.46) 
SOE -0.00994*** (-3.125) 
NCSKEWm t-1*SOE -0.04226** (-2.05) 
Marginal R2 10.554% 















Panel C: DUVOLm, t-1 
Intercept 0.01744*** (6.695) 
DUVOLm, t-1 0.00381*** (5.66) 
MOMENTUM -0.00500*** (-2.913) 
SDVOL 0.00615 (1.125) 
STOCKHOLDING 0.27810*** (10.244) 
SOE -0.01021*** (-3.232) 
DUVOLm, t-1*SOE -0.00345** (-2.434) 
Marginal R2 10.955% 





5.2  Robustness Tests 
5.2.1  Crash Risk as Public Information 
Due to the public nature of prior year crash risk, the relationships explored in H1 and 
H1B may be driven by market sentiment rather than inside information. Using daily stock return 
data, I construct a new variable, market VP, which replace SALES VP in my regression. Market 
VP is calculated as total daily stock trading value divided by total market value and is used as a 
proxy for a market reaction to crash risk. I compare my result against the coefficient from my 
first regression (Eq. 4) to determine the relative impact of crash risk on my response variable. I 
anticipate that the crash risk – insider sales relationship will be stronger as insider sales are more 
informed by prior crash risk while non-insider trades are less informed in general and less 
informed by prior crash risk specifically.  
𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝐵𝐵1𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +  𝐵𝐵2𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵3𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝐵𝐵4𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ∈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡      (7) 
where all variables remain the same from hypothesis 1A (Eq. 4) but I change my dependent 
variable to 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 which represents the value of daily firm-specific transactions as a 
percentage of total firm value. This variable is similar to SDVOL in that it measures market 
sentiment but has the advantage of allowing me to compare coefficients across different 
regressions. Table 7 clearly demonstrates the difference between Market VP and SALES VP. For 
all three crash risk measures, insider sales are more strongly affected than market transactions. 
Therefore, despite the public’s access to prior crash risk information, insiders still possess a 
better ability to process and understand the value of this information when considering their 
firm-specific stock transactions. This is in line with prior research demonstrating that insiders are 
better informed than the public (eg. Jaffe, 1974; Finnerty, 1976; Rozeff & Zaman, 1988; Seyhun, 
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2000). Insiders possess a macro information advantage that provides them with more contextual 
knowledge in comparison to external investors. This allows them to predict macroeconomic 
trends and detect deviations in systematic valuation in the market (Zhu et al, 2014). This macro 
information advantage trickles down to inform firm-specific valuations. It is also important to 
note that the counterparty to an insider transaction is a retail investor, a group that is not 
particularly investment savvy. 
Table 7: Market Reaction to Crash Risk 
I include my original H1 regressions alongside the market value percentage regressions for 
comparison. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. The effect of crash risk on insider sales is significantly stronger than on 
market transactions. A similar test conducted only on market sales yields qualitatively similar 
results. 
 Market VP Sales VP 
COUNTm,t-1 0.06421 (0.745) 0.00029** (2.545) 
NCSKEWm,t-1 1.16060** (1.887) 0.00354*** (4.064) 
DUVOLm,t-1 0.09282*** (2.218) 0.00031*** (5.216) 
 
5.2.2  Endogeneity  
A potential concern with my analysis could be that the relationship between prior crash 
risk and insider trading value is dynamically endogenous, e.g. prior insider behavimy dictates 
prior crash risk, which then effects current insider trading behaviour. To alleviate this concern, I 
construct an instrumental variable based on average crash risk of all other firms in the same 
industry (IV-COUNT, IV-NCSKEW, IV-DUVOL) as classified by the CSRC. Average crash risk 
in an industry peer group is likely to be correlated with the crash risk of an industry-member 
firm, since both are subject to similar market dynamics. Simultaneously, I have no reason to 
believe that such industry crash risk would affect the insider trading decisions of an individual 
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beyond typical market sentiment. Hence, I expect these measures to be uncorrelated with the 
error term. In stage 1, I take my endogenous crash risk variable as the dependent variable and use 
my instrumental variable as an explanatory variable. This regression provides predicted values 
for my endogenous variable. In stage 2, I return to my original regression model (Eq. 4) and 
replace my crash risk measure with my predicted value and then estimate values for the 
parameters using ordinary least squares regression. After controlling for possible endogeneity, 
individual insider sales value continues to be positively correlated with crash risk. For the case of 
a single endogenous regressor, Staiger and Stock (1994) suggest that instruments are weak if the 
first-stage F-statistic is less than ten. The F-statistics from my first-stage regressions are 15.387, 
30.934, and 116.16 for COUNT, NCSKEW, and DUVOL, respectively. Therefore, I proceed with 
my instruments into the second-stage regressions. My model computes the Wherry formula for 




Table 8: Instrumental Variable Regression 
Table 8 lists the results of my first-stage and second-stage regression with t-statistics in parentheses. My results are qualitatively 
similar to my findings from hypothesis 1A, alleviating endogeneity concerns. I do not include year or industry fixed effects. The 
superscripts *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Industry-year mean COUNTm,t-1 
 First Stage Regression Second Stage 
Intercept 0.06223** (2.813) 0.01886*** (7.028)  
IV-COUNTm, t-1 0.93353*** (3.923) 0.059267***  (2.681) 
MOMENTUM -  -0.00674*** (-3.756) 
SDVOL - 0.02569*** (6.021) 
STOCKHOLDING - 0.26338*** (13.021) 












Panel B: Industry-year mean NCSKEWm,t-1 
 First Stage Regression Second Stage 
Intercept 0.006489*** (3.968) 0.01374*** (10.503) 
IV-NCSKEWm,t-1 0.804636*** (5.563) 0.18110** (2.009) 
MOMENTUM -  -0.00780*** (-4.469) 
SDVOL - 0.02460*** (5.807) 
STOCKHOLDING - 0.26465*** (13.076) 
Adjusted R2 - 9.559% 
 
Panel C: Industry-year mean DUVOLm,t-1 
 First Stage Regression Second Stage 
Intercept 0.08623*** (4.254) 0.01335*** (11.446) 
IV-DUVOLm,t-1 1.02353*** (10.778) 0.00998** (2.527) 
MOMENTUM -  -0.00766*** (-4.390) 
SDVOL - 0.02543*** (5.970) 
STOCKHOLDING - 0.26430*** (13.067) 




6. Conclusion and Limitations 
The goal of this study was to investigate the empirical association between prior crash 
risk and insider transactions. As the main core of the article, I test hypotheses focused on 
individual or aggregate insider transactions. Additionally, I examined how corporate ownership 
impacts the strength of the crash risk – insider trade value relationship. By employing a prior 
crash risk measure, I circumvent the causality concerns surrounding crash risk and insider 
trading, allowing me to effectively examine how insiders trade based on crash risk. The prior 
crash risk measure has the additional benefit of being wholly public information, allowing me to 
compare how insiders and external traders react to the same information. The results indicate that 
insiders react more strongly to crash risk than external traders, which indicates that insiders still 
possess some form of information advantage. I conclude that this information advantage exists in 
two ways. Firstly, insiders have a greater capacity to assess the underlying and long-term effects 
of prior crash risk on current stockholdings. Future research can examine analyst transactions 
rather than market transactions, as analysts should be better informed about publicly available 
information yet precluded from private information. Secondly, I believe that existing crash risk 
measures as defined by Chen et al. (2001) may not fully capture a firm’s crash risk and that non-
systemic, non-public information also sways an insider’s decision to trade against market 
sentiment.  
Both crash risk and insider trading can severely damage investors’ welfare and 
confidence. The consequence of crash risk on insider trading behaviour is especially important, 
as both the market and shareholders take their cue from disclosed insider trades. Due to the 
correlated nature of prior, current, and future crash risk, significant insider sales following prior 
crash risk may signal that prior observed crash risk has not been mitigated. This may result in a 
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continuing fall in share price as investors lose more confidence in the firm. The Enron scandal is 
a spectacular example of falling investor confidence after significant stock price crash risk. 
Therefore, my analysis here focuses on both science and policy. Science considers the 
implications of my findings for market efficiency. Policy seeks to determine the effectiveness of 
current regulations and the implications of insider advantages for market fairness and 
performance. Prior literature has discussed the benefits of insider trading with regards to 
improving market efficiency and weighs it against its negative effects on market fairness. In an 
unregulated market, insiders would profitably trade on private information and the market would 
ultimately adjust such that firm-specific news would not impact stock price. In a draconian 
regulatory system, insiders are fully prevented from trading profitably, which increases external 
investor confidence at the cost of being prohibitively expensive. Unlike the U.S., China’s insider 
trading regulatory system is not sufficiently effective in reducing insider advantage, but the 
controls put in place in Chinese SOEs demonstrate that insider behaviour following crash risk 
can be contained. From a fairness perspective, such controls are desirable as they limit insiders 
from selling stocks on potentially private information. In the event that no private information 
exists, limiting insider sales is still desirable as it alleviates future stock price crash risk. Firms 
can implement measures that protect shareholder welfare in addition to firm health. An ex-ante 
preventative measure such as a policy requiring approval by the firm’s general counsel prior to 
an insider sale would serve to limit exploitative trading (Dai et al., 2016). In addition to ex-ante 
preventative measures, well-governed firms may use ex-post disciplinary measures such as fines 
or forced turnovers to discourage other insiders from engaging in undesirable trading.  
Future research needs to account for abnormal returns after insider trades to determine if 
trades motivated by crash risk lead to greater trading profits. Additionally, these studies can also 
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examine if managers can time their trades effectively to maximize profits and minimize legal 
jeopardy. From a mechanistic perspective, this study could be better improved with the use of 
rolling crash risk measures rather than the month-specific measures I employed. This would 
allow for a unique crash risk measure for each insider transaction. Future studies would also 
benefit from a larger sample in terms of both number of firms studied and period of study. My 
study focuses only on A-shares in the Shanghai Stock Exchange but future studies can expand to 
other Chinese stock exchanges including the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange (HKEX). China currently uses A, B, and H shares which trade under different 
denominations and bylaws, so special consideration is required when studying these different 
share types. A larger sample also benefits the study of aggregate insider transactions – my 
NETSALE and NETSALE6 regressions both utilized limited samples and found inconclusive 
results. There is also justification for using a one-month aggregation period, which has the 
benefit of increasing observations and limiting noise associated with larger aggregation periods, 
but suffers from overrepresentation from large individual transactions driven by non-crash risk 
related information. Future research should strive to control for information hierarchy by 
categorizing insider trades based on insider status within the firm - Seyhun (2000) defines a 
“director month” as one where directors trade the greatest dollar amount of stock during that 
month. Finally, while I control for firm size in my variable construction, it would be interesting 
to segregate firms into size quintiles and observe how firm size influences the crash risk - insider 
trading relationship.  
To conclude, this paper seeks to analyze whether prior crash risk affects insider trading. 
Using a Chinese dataset of disclosed insider transactions, I examine whether insiders can 
effectively use publicly available prior crash risk information to inform their trades. In particular, 
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I seek to contribute to the literature in four ways. First, I demonstrate how to use crash risk as a 
predictor variable by using prior crash risk in my regressions, allowing me to draw meaningful 
conclusions about its impact on insider sales. Secondly, I examine how insiders can form an 
information advantage using only public information through their enhanced capacity to assess 
such information. Alternatively, my study demonstrates that crash risk measurements may not 
adequately capture a firm’s crash risk, indicating that future research can expand on Chen et al. 
(2001) calculations. Thirdly, I contribute to the extant literature documenting the moderating 
effect of corporate governance on insider trading with a unique use of SOE status as an indicator. 
Finally, my study complements previous studies by observing an emerging market. China 
possesses a number of unique characteristics that make it a ripe study for insider trading, namely 
its weak and politically motivated legal system, highly concentrated corporate ownership, recent 
transition to free market share trading, and high percentage of retail investors. My results suggest 
the following conclusions. 
First, looking across all firms and insider transactions, my estimated results are 
supportive of a positive relationship between prior crash risk and insider sales value. This is 
consistent with my intuitive belief that insiders opt to sell shares in the presence of crash risk. I 
further tested this hypothesis by subsampling crash risk into high and low groups to examine the 
potential for insiders to buy shares in the presence of crash risk – I determined that high crash 
risk is correlated with high selling activity while low crash risk yields insignificant transactional 
activity. It is important to note that my estimated results for aggregate insider transactions were 
inconclusive and that this requires further research in the future. 
Second, I established that there are significant differences between SOEs and non-SOEs 
in terms of insider motivations and restrictions. Significantly, insiders within state-owned 
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enterprises chose to limit their share sales in the presence of crash risk. However, my research 
does not allow us to determine if this sale limitation is due to a lack of business understanding or 
an unwillingness to engage in trading that may be interpreted as information-driven. In sum, my 
results support the view that individual insider sales are driven by prior crash risk and that 
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